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1UP'ALO LAW REVIEW
defendant's handwriting were found in his desk, that enough was proven for
conviction.
The Goldstein case has what the Court is looking for and what was missing
in the instant case-a concrete piece of evidence which logically connects
the circumstantial evidence to the crime, to wit: the overheard conversation and
policy slips in the one case, and the lack of proof that any of the names mentioned
were names of horses running that day together with sketchy identification of
the overheard voices as being those of the defendants in the instant case.
Appeal from Dismissal of Informafion
In People v. LevensteinU4 it was held that the state may appeal where a
demurrer is sustained and an information dismissed by a Court of Special Sessions.
Though the County Court had dismissed the appeal on the ground there was no
statutory right of appeal,65 the Court of Appeals reasoned that "indictment" in
section 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure included "information".
By amendment in 1954, section 518 was incorporated into section 750 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure by reference, specifically making the provisions of
section 518 applicable to courts of special session. Since courts of special session
proceed by way of information and not indictment the Legislature must have
intended indictment to include information. The 1954 amendment was mean-
ingless otherwise.
Such reasoning is consistent with earlier Appellate Division rulings that the
sustaining of a demurrer to an information is appealable.66 This tends to promote
the legislative policy of a uniform procedure in criminal cases.
Coram Nobis-Right fo Hearing
In People v. Lain67 denial of a hearing on a writ of error coram nobis was
reversed upon defendant's sworn allegation that he was not advised of his right
64. 309 N. Y. 433, 131 N.E. 2d 719 (1956).
65. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §518: An appeal to an appellate court may be
taken by the people in the following cases: 1. From a judgment for the defend-
ant, on a demurrer to the indictment ....
66. People v. Hammerstein, 150 App. Div. 212, 134 N. Y. Supp. 730 (1st Dep't
1912); People v. Firth, 157 App. Div. 492, 142 N. Y. Supp. 634 (2d Dep't 1913).
67. 309 N. Y. 291, 130 N.E. 2d 105 (1955).
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to counsel. 8 The Court held he was entitled to a hearing as to the truth of such
allegations.
But denial of a hearing on a writ of error coram nobis was affirmed in
People v. White,69 notwithstanding the petitioner's sworn allegation that he was
induced to plead guilty to second-degree larceny by the fraudulent misrepresen-
tation of the assistant district attorney and the sentencing judge.
The Lain case affirmed the doctrine that a petitioner upon a writ coram nobis
who swears to an allegation that he was not advised of his right to counsel is
entitled to a hearing in open court unless his claims are conclusively refuted by
unquestionable documentary proof.10 Therein it was held that the fact that one
lawyer filed a notice of appearance two days after a guilty plea, but was not heard
from in the record again, and that another lawyer repeated an answer given by de-
fendant, was not conclusive. Scant entries on the official record do not conclusively
disprove a sworn allegation that defendant was never told of his right to counsel.71
There is evidence that the assistant district attorney made representations in
the Wrhite case that petitioner would be sentenced as a second-felony offender
rather than a fourth offender upon a plea of guilty, but because of subsequent
actions of petitioner and his counsel prior to sentencing there was deemed no
reliance upon such representations. Petitioner by affidavit acknowledged that
prior to sentence he abandoned reliance upon the so-called agreement. The court
supported this position by pointing to notations in the indictment and the
minutes of the hearings.
The court further noted that the request of the judge for executive clemency
upon sentencing did not amount to a guaranty of executive clemency, but merely
a conclusion, representing the opinion of the defendant. In denying a hearing,
the court held that bare allegations not confirmed by recorded facts are insufficient
in law to warrant the granting of a hearing, and the defendant was not entitled to
a hearing on a charge lacking factual support. They also found the record
convincingly demonstrated the falsity of the allegation.
Though the Lain and White cases are quite different factually, the basic
principles governing each must be the same. Coram nobis is the appropriate
68. N. Y. CODE CrIM. PROC.: §188 When the defendant is brought before a
magistrate . . . the magistrate must inform him of the charge - . . and his right
to aid of counsel .... §308 If a defendant appears for arraignment without coun-
sel, he must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel, and if he does the court
must assign counsel ....
69. 309 N. Y. 636, 132 N.E. 2d 880 (1956).
70. People v. Richetti, 302 N. Y. 290, 97 N.E. 2d 105 (1951).
71. People v. Guariglia, 303 N. Y. 338, 102 N.E. 2d 580 (1951).
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method of correcting a result inconsistent with due process of law. It is the
proper remedy for a court to reopen its judgment where the same was based
on trickery, deceit, coercion or misrepresentation in the procurement of a plea,72
and where a defendant has not been advised of his right to counsel.
It is apparent from the reading of these two cases that they are inconsistent.
The Lain case says a hearing will be granted upon a sworn allegation unless
"conclusively refuted by unquestionable documentary proof,"73 while the White
case requires the sworn allegation be supported by "recorded fact" before a hearing
will be granted. One says a hearing will only be denied where "refuted" by the
record, while the other requires "support" in the record before a hearing will be
forthcoming.
Furthermore, the Lain case affirms the proposition that scant entries on
official records do not disprove sworn allegations, while in White it was deter-
mined that excerpts and notations from the clerk's records were "conclusive" to
disprove the allegations.
In determining that the "guaranty" of executive clemency was merely an
opinion, as evidenced by the judge's statement at sentencing, the court in the
White case ignored the possibility that such a guaranty had been verbally made
to the defendant prior to sentencing and in reliance thereon he did not withdraw
his plea of guilty. After sentencing a defendant is precluded from withdrawing
a plea of guilty.74 Such an error would not appear in the record, vitiating any
right of appeal. As a result, the only remedy available is coram nobis if defendant
is not to be denied due process of law.
Therefore it appears that the dissent of Judge Desmond is correct, and it is
impossible to reconcile the White decision with the precedents. Possibly this
case is a sign of judicial policy to restrict hearing upon a writ of coram nobis as far
as possible and thereby combat the flood of such petitions plaguing the courts
causing a wealth of litigation thereunder. It may be argued that this procedure
has been a green light, opening the gates of our prisons and unleashing hardened
criminals upon the unwary public. But state action must be consistent with the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice. The public safety is ultimately insured
by the protection of the rights of the individual.
72. Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N. Y. 19, 47 N.E. 2d 425 (1943).
73. People v. Langen, 303 N. Y. 474, 104 N.E. 2d 861 (1952).
74. N. Y. CODE CalM. PROC.: §337 The court may in its discretion at any time
before judgment on a plea of guilty, permit it to be withdrawn ....
